

THE  
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN

---

THE CHICAGO SCHOOL.<sup>1</sup>

BY PROFESSOR WILLIAM JAMES.

The rest of the world has made merry over the Chicago man's legendary saying that 'Chicago hasn't had time to get round to culture yet, but when she does strike her, she'll make her hum.' Already the prophecy is fulfilling itself in a dazzling manner. Chicago has a School of Thought!—a school of thought which, it is safe to predict, will figure in literature as the School of Chicago for twenty-five years to come. Some universities have plenty of thought to show, but no school; others plenty of school, but no thought. The University of Chicago, by its Decennial Publications, shows real thought and a real school. Professor John Dewey, and at least ten of his disciples, have collectively put into the world a statement, homogeneous in spite of so many coöperating minds, of a view of the world, both theoretical and practical, which is so simple, massive, and positive that, in spite of the fact that many parts of it yet need to be worked out, it deserves the title of a new system of philosophy. If it be as true as it is original, its publication must be reckoned an important event. The present reviewer, for one, strongly suspects it of being true.

<sup>1</sup>1. *Studies in Logical Theory*, John Dewey, with the coöperation of members and fellows of the Department of Philosophy. The Decennial Publications, second series, Volume XI., Chicago. The University of Chicago Press, 1903. 2. *The Definition of the Psychical*, George H. Mead. 3. *Existence, Meaning and Reality*, A. W. Moore. 4. *Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality*, John Dewey. 5. *The Relations of Philosophy to Philosophy*, James Rowland Angell. Reprints from Volume III. of the first series of Decennial Publications, *ibid.*, 1903.

The briefest characterization is all that will be attempted here. Criticism from various quarters will doubtless follow, for about the new system as a bone of contention discussion is bound to rage.

Like Spencer's philosophy, Dewey's is an evolutionism; but unlike Spencer, Dewey and his disciples have so far (with the exception of Dewey's admirable writings on ethics) confined themselves to establishing certain general principles without applying them to details. Unlike Spencer, again, Dewey is a pure empiricist. There is nothing real, whether being or relation between beings, which is not direct matter of experience. There is no Unknowable or Absolute behind or around the finite world. No Absolute, either, in the sense of anything eternally constant; no term is static, but everything is process and change.

Like Spencer, again, Dewey makes biology and psychology continuous. 'Life,' or 'experience,' is the fundamental conception; and whether you take it physically or mentally, it involves an adjustment between terms. Dewey's favorite word is 'situation.' A situation implies at least two factors, each of which is both an independent variable and a function of the other variable. Call them *E* (environment) and *O* (organism) for simplicity's sake. They interact and develop each other without end; for each action of *E* upon *O* changes *O*, whose reaction in turn upon *E* changes *E*, so that *E*'s new action upon *O* gets different, eliciting a new reaction, and so on indefinitely. The situation gets perpetually 'reconstructed,' to use another of Professor Dewey's favorite words, and this reconstruction is the process of which all reality consists.

I am in some doubt as to whether, in the last resort, Dewey thinks monistically or pluralistically of this reality. He often talks of 'experience' in the singular as if it were one universal process and not a collective name for many particular processes. But all his special statements refer to particular processes only, so I will report him in pluralistic terms.

No biological processes are treated of in this literature, except as incidental to ethical discussion, and the ethical discussions would carry us too far afield. I will confine myself

therefore to the psychological or epistemological doctrines of the school.

Consciousness is functionally active in readjustment. In perfectly 'adapted' situations, where adjustments are fluent and stereotyped, it exists in minimal degree. Only where there is hesitation, only where past habit will not run, do we find that the situation awakens explicit thought. Thought is thus incidental to change in experience, to conflict between the old and new. The situation must be reconstructed if activity is to be resumed, and the rejudging of it mentally is the reconstruction's first stage. The nucleus of the *Studies in Logical Theory* becomes thus an account of the judging process.

"In psychological terms we may say, in explanation of the judging process, that some stimulus to action has failed to function properly as a stimulus, and that the activity which was going on has been interrupted. Response in the accustomed way has failed. In such a case there arises a division in experience into sensation content as subject and ideal content as predicate. In other words, \* \* \* upon failure of the accustomed stimulus to be adequate \* \* \* activity ceases, and is resumed in an integral form only when a new habit is set up to which the new or altered stimulus is adequate. It is in this process of reconstruction that subject and predicate appear." The old subject (the *that* of the situation) stands for the interrupted habit, the new subject (the *that* with the new *what* added) stands for the new habit begun. The predicate is thus essentially hypothetical—the situations to which the use of it leads may have quickly to be reconstructed in turn. In brief, *S* is a stimulus intellectually irritating; *P* is an hypothesis in response; *SP* is a mental action, which normally is destined to lead or pass into action in a wider sense. The sense of 'objectivity' in the *S* emerges emphatically only when the *P* is problematic and the action undefined. Then only does the *S* arrest attention, and its contrast with the self become acute. 'Knowing,' therefore, or the conscious relation of the object to the self, is thus only an incident in the wider process of 'adjustment,' which includes unconscious adjustments as well.

This leads Professor Dewey and his disciples to a peculiar view of 'fact.' What is a fact? A fact and a theory have not different natures, as is usually supposed, the one being objective, the other subjective. They are both made of the same material, experience-material namely, and their difference relates to their way of functioning solely. What is fact for one epoch, or for one inquirer, is theory for another epoch or another inquirer. It is 'fact' when it functions steadily; it is 'theory' when we hesitate. 'Truth' is thus in process of formation like all other things. It consists not in conformity or correspondence with an externally fixed archetype or model. Such a thing would be irrelevant even if we knew it to exist. Truth consists in a character inclosed within the 'situation.' Whenever a situation has the maximum of stability, and seems most satisfactory to its own subject-factor, it is true for him. If accused here of opening the door to systematic protagonism, Professor Dewey would reply that the concrete facts themselves are what keep his scepticism from being systematic in any practically objectionable sense. Experience is continually enlarging, and the object-factors of our situations are always getting problematic, making old truths unsatisfactory, and obliging new ones to be found. The object-factors moreover are common to ourselves and others; and our truths have to be mated with those of our fellow men. The real safeguard against caprice of statement and indetermination of belief is that there is a 'grain' in things against which we can't practically go. But as the grain creates itself from situation to situation, so the truth creates itself *pari passu*, and there is no eternally standing system of extra-subjective verity to which our judgments, ideally and in advance of the facts, are obliged to conform.

There are two great gaps in the system, which none of the Chicago writers have done anything to fill, and until they are filled, the system, as a system, will appear defective. There is no cosmology, no positive account of the order of physical fact, as contrasted with mental fact, and no account of the fact (which I assume the writers to believe in) that different subjects share a common object-world. These lacunæ can hardly be

inadvertent — we shall doubtless soon see them filled in some way by one or another member of the school.

I might go into much greater technical detail, and I might in particular make many a striking quotation. But I prefer to be exceedingly summary, and merely to call the reader's attention to the importance of this output of Chicago University. Taking it *en gros*, what strikes me most in it is the great sense of concrete reality with which it is filled. It seems a promising *via media* between the empiricist and transcendentalist tendencies of our time. Like empiricism, it is individualistic and phenomenistic; it places truth *in rebus*, and not *ante rem*. It resembles transcendentalism, on the other hand, in making value and fact inseparable, and in standing for continuities and purposes in things. It employs the genetic method to which both schools are now accustomed. It coincides remarkably with the simultaneous movement in favor of 'pragmatism' or 'humanism' set up quite independently at Oxford by Messrs. Schiller and Sturt. It probably has a great future, and is certainly something of which Americans may be proud. Professor Dewey ought to gather into another volume his scattered essays and addresses on psychological and ethical topics, for now that his philosophy is systematically formulated, these throw a needed light.

## PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

*Les Obsessions et la Psychasthénie.* T. I. PIERRE JANET. Pp. xii + 764. T. II. F. RAYMOND et PIERRE JANET. Pp. xxiv + 543. Paris, Félix Alcan. 1903.

In this work, which by virtue of its mere bulk as well as by reason of its scientific and literary qualities may truly be called monumental, M. Janet continues the already extended and remarkably brilliant series of studies in mental pathology which have established for him a reputation second to none among the investigators in this field in our generation. As in the case of the *Névroses et Idées fixes*, the second volume is written in collaboration with Professor Raymond and contains the clinical material on which the views set forth in the first volume are principally based — a record, in all, of two hundred and thirty-six observations. The subject of the study is a variety of phenomena — obsessions, phobias, morbid impulses, morbid states of excitement and distress, mental manias, tics, neurasthenias, queer feelings of strangeness, of loss of personality, etc. — in all of which the author finds a common character, a fundamental defect which they all express and by which they are all to be explained. Hence their union in one group. This common character is a certain enfeeblement of psychological function defined as a lowering or relaxing of the psychological tension. What this more precisely means, we shall see presently. Here at the outset we note only the central idea and primary aim of the treatise as a whole: it is that these diverse diseases constitute a single great psycho-neurosis, namely, psychasthenia, distinct from and yet related to the already recognized great psycho-neuroses of epilepsy and hysteria. This classification and the development of the principle on which it is grounded is the special contribution which the treatise claims to make to science.

The method of approach to the establishment of this principle and the wide range of the topics discussed in the treatise may best be indicated by an outline of its contents. The book — the reference is to the first volume — falls into two parts. The first part consists of an analysis of the symptoms. It treats in successive chapters of the obsessive ideas, their content and their form; of the agitating mental, motor and emotional disturbances (*agitations forcées*); and of the

psychasthenic 'stigmata.' These last are defined as "modifications in the functioning of the psychological processes which are independent of the obsessions and of the 'forced' operations" (p. 268); they include the feelings of incompleteness, inadequacy or defect (*senti-ments d'incomplétude*) on the part of the subjects themselves, together with those psychological deficiencies, such as indolence, timidity, revery, the need of guidance, of loving and of being loved, etc., which are manifest to the observer. Under this head the author also treats of the physiological defects, but attributes to our knowledge of them an altogether subordinate importance for our understanding of the disease. The second part is entitled "General studies on the lowering of the psychological tension." The first chapter treats of the pathogenic theories, advancing in a first section, by way of exposition and criticism of the intellectual and emotional theories, to the theory of psychasthenia, the principle of which is explained at length in the section following, while a third section applies the theory to the interpretation of the symptoms. The second chapter deals, under the general title of evolution, with the etiological conditions and with the development of the disease; the third, with its diagnosis and treatment. Finally, there is a general conclusion, discussing the place of psychasthenia among the psycho-neuroses.

The central conception of the work, then, is the unification and interpretation of a multitude of diverse symptoms under the one principle of psychasthenia. The time is not so very distant when every mania, every phobia, every form of obsession, was regarded as a curious and independent disease. That time is now past, but the various unifications proposed all seem at some point open to criticism. In uniting the diverse symptoms under the principle of psychasthenia, Janet claims to have introduced greater precision into the classification than his predecessors and certainly has gone farther. Thus he includes under the principle not only obsessions, phobias and mental manias, but, *e. g.*, tics. His treatment of tics affords a very good illustration of the way in which he connects phenomena that at first sight seem to be unlike. The tic used to be regarded as any minute and evanescent movement, spasmodic, automatic or reflex. Since Charcot, however, called the tic a caricature of acts, its systematic character has been more generally recognized along with its rapidity and minuteness. Janet defines the tic as 'an act reproduced regularly and frequently, but in a manner altogether inopportune, useless and incomplete because the will feels forced to perform it' (p. 164). The so-called *tic douloureux* is, accordingly, no tic at all, but a simple

spasm; an example of a true tic would be the movement, reducing itself eventually to a simple contraction of the fore-finger, of constantly touching the ear to verify the presence of the ear-ring (p. 161). Now the interesting thing about this conception is that it enables the author to treat these, and similar movements, from the psychological point of view. They are psychological in their origin. This is the first point. The next thing is to connect them with the patients' mental manias by showing that the latter possess altogether similar characters. But it had already been shown, in the section dealing with the subject, that there is a class of patients in whom the various manias of interrogation, hesitation, precision, repetition, perfection, expiation, conjuration, etc., appear as 'forced agitations' repeatedly occurring, not wholly independently of the will, but in a manner inopportune, useless and incomplete. Similar characters also appear in the obsessions of these patients. In the section dealing with this subject Janet has sought to show that, along with the characters which pertain to the content of the obsessive ideas, which always relate to acts of the subject and never, as in the case of hysterical subjects, to mere objects, and are of a sort to suggest a profound disturbance of cerebral functions and are never, as again in the case of the hysterical, merely imposed from without, they have everywhere the form of incompleteness, that the fixed ideas and associations are only in a certain limited degree independent of volition, that the tendency to action is never so necessary and constrained as to lead to execution, that the hallucinations are only symbolic, pseudo-hallucinations, never complete, that the patients never altogether believe in their obsessions, that the obsessive idea is imperfectly developed, that, in brief, the obsession is more or less voluntarily entertained and criticised, never effectively developed or disposed of.

We are thus led to the consideration of the principle which serves to unite these very various symptoms in one group. In the chapter on the stigmata of psychasthenia, Janet presents an imposing catalogue of psychical, and also of physical, deficiencies in the subjects of whom he treats. As already indicated, these deficiencies are partly appreciated by the subjects themselves (*sentiments d'incomplétude*), partly revealed to observation. The former, *e. g.*, include feelings of difficulty and inability in action, indecision, automatism, discontent, revolt; feelings of difficulty in thinking, dulness of comprehension, imperfect perception, loss of the sense of time, doubt; feelings of indifference, restlessness, need of excitement; feelings, finally, in regard to the self — feelings of strangeness, of a divided self, of loss of per-

sonality. To the latter belong in only a subordinate degree, if at all, the symptoms characteristic of hysteria — anæsthesias, subconscious movements, the hypnotic sleep, suggestion — but, on the other hand, a multitude of disorders of will, intelligence and emotion which confirm the view taken by the subjects themselves of their lack of ability to meet, in certain respects, at least, the normal demands of physical and social life. On the basis of this broad survey of the facts, Janet criticises both the intellectual and the emotional theory of obsessions. He regards the latter, which considers the emotional distress, or phobia, the primary phenomenon, as a decided advance over the former, which made the fixed idea the essential character; it is an advance because it points to a profounder source of the disease. But it is unsatisfactory; in particular, it is too vague and at once too general and too narrow. It is too vague, because the conception of emotion is still vague in psychology. It can be used, and frequently is used, in a sense so broad as to preclude discussion. Pitres and Régis in their Moscow report endeavor to make it more precise by reference to the James-Lange hypothesis,<sup>1</sup> but fail to show how the crises of obsession are to be distinguished from other pathological states also accompanied by marked visceral changes. This theory, again, can only rest in generalities, it cannot explain the differences in the cases in detail, the difference, *e. g.*, between the phenomena consequent on emotional shock in a hysterical subject and those which follow in a crisis of scruple. And it is too narrow because it leaves many essential phenomena entirely out of account. Thus the metaphysical obsessions relating to the dualism of God and the devil result, Janet tells us, in one of his patients, not from visceral, but from previous mental disturbance. This criticism (pp. 461 ff.) shows at least the need of more, and more careful, investigation into the place of emotion in pathological conditions, and for the benefit of those who are disposed to see in all pathological states a fundamental visceral disturbance the opinion of Janet, based as it is on an experience so wide and carefully considered as his is, is worth quoting, namely, "that a great number of these troubles, of these cases of psychological insufficiency, cannot be regarded as secondary to visceral modifications, but result primarily from a cerebral trouble, constitutional or accidental, in which the emotional element plays but a very small part" (p. 469). But besides the intellectual and the emotional theory, there is a volitional theory of these phenomena, the theory that the fundamental defect is a de-

<sup>1</sup> In their recent work *Obsessions et Impulsions*, Paris, 1902, p. 194, these authors deny having formally adopted this hypothesis.

fect of will. Janet himself lays great stress on defects of the volitional order. But he believes it necessary to get back of these distinctions of intellect, feeling and will and all these interminable discussions as to which is primary and primarily affected and to look for the more general disturbance whence all the special disorders of intellect, emotion and volition arise. An examination of a very large number of cases has shown a general or special mental insufficiency in all their varied phenomena which has been designated as psychasthenia. What, now, more precisely, is the nature of this defect?

As psychological deficiency means inability, or at least difficulty, in the performance of psychological functions, the first thing which Janet proposes is to determine what functions are relatively more and less difficult. He accordingly seeks to establish first a hierarchy of psychological phenomena, to arrange them, that is, in classes, designated as 'higher' and 'lower,' with reference to degrees of difficulty and facility in their performance, and that, not on any *a priori* grounds, but as indicated by the pathological facts themselves. From this point of view, the first place is given to 'the function of the real,' that is, the apprehension of reality in any form. The highest degree of this function relates to prompt and effective action; next comes attention in the perception of reality, with belief. A position of special importance in this class is assigned to the formation of the consciousness of present time, the nature and significance of which psychologists have hitherto but imperfectly understood. In the next class is placed 'disinterested' activity, including habitual action, action without the feeling of the present, of unity or of freedom, and perception without the sense of certainty and with the sense of the present vague. In a third, still lower class, are reckoned the functions of images — purely representative memory, imagination, abstract reasoning and reverie; in a fourth, visceral emotional reactions; and in a fifth, the lowest, useless muscular movements, such as tics. This classification is admittedly schematic and provisional; it claims, however, to be in general agreement with the facts. In the psychasthenic psychological functions "disappear the more quickly the higher, and persist the longer the lower their coefficient of reality"; from which it is concluded that "these operations form a series of decreasing difficulty and complexity according as their . . . correspondence with reality diminishes" (p. 487).

The cardinal defect in psychasthenia thus appears as a defect relative to the function of apprehending and acting towards the real. The question then is, what makes this function difficult? For answer

we must analyze the function. Some have supposed the deficiency due to a lack of vividness in the presentation, others to the absence of intervening movement; Janet's previous writings might lead one to think that he would regard it as due to a lack of mental synthesis. None of these explanations, however, touches, in his opinion, the essence of the matter, important as they all are, or may be, as factors. The function of the real is essentially characterized, he holds, in its highest degrees by two phenomena; these are (1) unification, concentration, a phenomenon specially important when novel and constituting the mental synthesis, and (2) the number, or mass, of the psychological phenomena which enter into this synthesis. A certain relative complexity of elements, then, and a certain relative completeness of their synthesis constitute the function. And as Janet in his former writings had emphasized the importance for normal mental life of the function of synthesis, so here, as a sort of new discovery, he emphasizes the coördinate importance of the complexity of the elements that enter into it. We are now prepared for the formula which, as already indicated, characterizes for Janet the essential defect in psychasthenia. The presence of the two phenomena mentioned, complexity and synthesis, in the function of the real form together what may conventionally be termed the 'psychological tension.' The function of the real with action, perception of reality, certainty, are phenomena of high tension, on a higher mental level; revery, motor agitation, emotion are phenomena of low tension, on a lower mental level. We thus get a unification of the phenomena of psychasthenia parallel to that which Janet had previously made of the phenomena of hysteria. He had characterized the fundamental defect of hysteria as 'a narrowing of the field of consciousness'; he now characterizes the fundamental defect in psychasthenia as 'a lowering of the psychological tension.' He does not doubt that the psychological tension corresponds to a physiological tension in the central nervous system. Psychasthenia is, at the same time, neurasthenia. But in our ignorance of the conditions on which cerebral tension depends, it is better, he thinks, to follow at present the indications of the clinical material on the psychological side and not waste our efforts in the construction of hypothetical physiology.

The theory thus generally stated gets a further and more precise construction as it comes to be applied to the interpretation of the symptoms. First, we have the feeling of insufficiency on the part of the patients themselves. This is easily interpreted as the obvious subjective transcription of the fact of the diminution of the psychological

tension. It is not necessary to suppose that the subject has a direct consciousness of the emission of the nervous force; it is enough that he should be aware of its result. Assuming this, the feeling of deficiency is accounted for by three coöperating factors, defect of mental synthesis, reduction of the mental complexity and memory of the contrasted earlier state in which the psychical functions and contents were at once more unified and more complex. This retrospection is important, because the psychasthenic is, as a rule, very intelligent; and for the same reason it is important to consider the mental richness regarded as inherent in the function of the real as wholly relative; an imbecile probably never needs anything but a simple thought, but a mind accustomed to a certain maximum of consciousness calls that maximum real and no longer recognizes the real and the present when this maximum is lost (p. 548).

So much for the subjective sense of incompleteness — the interpretation here follows the hypothesis with relative directness and immediacy. When, however, we come to the '*agitations forcées*,' this is no longer the case. For while we find diminution of the psychological tension in that a lower form of activity has been substituted for a higher, this lower form takes on so extraordinary a development that it is no longer enough to point to the mere fact of the decline. To account for this novel feature in the symptoms, Janet supplements his hypothesis by the idea of 'derivation.' The principle is stated as follows: 'When a force primarily destined to be expended in the production of a certain phenomenon remains unutilized because this phenomenon has become impossible, it produces derivations, that is to say, it produces other phenomena unforeseen and useless' (p. 555). This principle has long been recognized in certain of its forms; Janet would extend it to a wide range of pathological phenomena, to cerebral phenomena such as automatically associated images, abstract ideas and reasonings, as well as to muscular and visceral disturbances. It is in favor of this principle that he rejects the theory of the exclusively genital origin of these agitations; they can be produced, he holds, whenever a phenomenon of higher tension has begun, but is arrested in its development by a lowering of the psychological tension which makes its execution impossible. And so the characteristic crises of emotional distress and mental rumination are regarded, not as a sort of subjective reaction against the painful sense of insufficiency, but as secondary phenomena derived from the initial forces of will, attention and emotion which sought expression in phenomena of high tension but failed by reason of mental incapacity. Now this principle ex-

plains, in Janet's view, the extraordinarily rich development of these phenomena. For just as a physical force when duly applied produces phenomena that do not appear to us excessive, but when otherwise applied produces effects of alarming proportions, so, he argues (p. 559), when a psychological phenomenon is very superior to another in the hierarchy of functions, the tension required for its production, if otherwise employed, could produce an inferior phenomenon a hundred times as great.

Another feature of the phenomena which requires explanation is their systematic specialization. They are not all vague and diffuse, nor is the patient an imbecile. His incapacity extends not to the whole of the mental life; it is specifically related to certain acts, operations and objects. How now shall we account for this specialization? The problem has two parts; the first relates to the specialization of the psychological deficiencies, the second to the systematization of the derivations. The specialization of the psychological deficiencies is accounted for by the special difficulty afforded by certain acts and operations. Such difficulty is partly natural, partly artificial. Among acts naturally difficult, naturally demanding high tension, Janet reckons as in the first rank social acts, involving consideration of others and their consideration of us. Here belong, *e. g.*, the acts connected with marriage and the sexual relation; also acts connected with one's trade or profession. A very large number of the cases are included within these groups. An act becomes artificially difficult when, from being performed in a simple manner, there is an effort made to perform it in a manner adequate and complete. Example: a prayer made with full realization of its theological and philosophical implications as compared with the same prayer repeated in the simple faith and with the simple intelligence of childhood. There is a great variety of operations of this sort to which, for one reason and another, the attention of the patient becomes drawn and which he seeks to perform with a perfection for which his fundamentally diseased condition, his inability to sustain a function of high tension, renders him incompetent. Thus his psychological insufficiencies become specialized. The systematization of the derivations is accounted for by three principles—individual predisposition, habit and the best adaptation possible. The first determines the general categories of the reaction, the second leads to its repetition, the third gives to the derived phenomena a certain relation to the primary, which failed of being accomplished. The mental manias of the patients are referred to this third principle and, indirectly, the systematic character of the tics, which are regarded as their consequence.

A similar explanation, finally, is given of the obsessive ideas: they are the symptoms and consequences of the more radical defect, the lowering of the psychological tension. Their most fruitful source is internal, the patient's sense of lack and his actual psychological deficiencies. Even when occasioned by some external circumstance, there are always present, in Janet's opinion, these other conditions, by which the subject is prepared. As illustrating the interpretation of the facts from this point of view, we may take the case of the patient obsessed by the hallucinatory idea of the *membrum virile* desecrating the host. The explanation Janet gives of this idea is as follows: The patient is, before all else, a psychasthenic, possessing the sense of lack. Hence results, first, a crisis of efforts in the form of convulsive movements. Such movements are largely determined by a 'derivation' from the higher phenomena that have become impossible. These movements lead to genital excitements, these to masturbations. This vice becomes for the subject the symbol of her fall. Other manias, of generalization, of the infinite, etc., drive her to the extremity; she associates religious crimes with genital faults and so symbolizes her opinion of herself by the hallucination of the *membrum virile* and the host (p. 585). In other cases the connection of the obsession with the sense of deficiency is much more direct than this, as, *e. g.*, in that of John Bunyan obsessed by the idea of falling deeper and deeper with every step into a slough, and that of the man with an abnormal dread of social intercourse, obsessed by the idea of becoming a priest (p. 586). But the principle is the same throughout. And the formal features of the obsessions, such as their persistence, the part played in them by the association of ideas and their impulsive character, are also interpreted (pp. 596 ff.) as pointing to the same fundamental defect.

There is no space here, nor is this perhaps the place, to treat of the more medical aspects of the discussion. The interested reader will find these fully dealt with, and in masterly fashion, with a wealth of sane suggestion, in the chapters on the etiology and progress of the disease and on its diagnosis and treatment. Reference, however, must be made to the author's final disposition of the disease as a special psycho-neurosis. It was his aim, we remember, to establish psychasthenia as such a special psycho-neurosis alongside of the already recognized psycho-neuroses of epilepsy and hysteria. How, then, are these three great pathological conditions related and distinguished? As regards the relation of psychasthenia to epilepsy, the two have many features in common, the principal one being decline or fall of mental or nervous tension. In the epileptic attack this is sudden and often

results in a complete loss of self-consciousness, in psychasthenia it is continued and less complete. The convulsions of the epileptic are phenomena of derivation, like the mental ruminations of the subjects of psychasthenia, but of a more elementary order. On the other hand, with the partial recovery of the mental tension, phenomena characteristic of psychasthenia, such as the feeling of insufficiency, doubts of the reality of self and of the world, etc., are also met with in the epileptic. The conclusion is that 'the psychasthenic state is an attenuated and chronic epilepsy' (p. 734). As regards the relation of psychasthenia to hysteria, here too we meet certain common features, such as defects of will and attention and diminution of mental and nervous activity, and there are cases of transition between these states. But, in general, the relation here is one of contrast, hysteria being characterized by a narrowing of the field of consciousness with full, even excessive, development of the phenomena within that field, psychasthenia by a general lowering of the mental tension, a general enfeeblement of the higher functions. Psychasthenia, in brief, occupies a position between epilepsy and hysteria. It is closely related to neurasthenia and possibly to certain forms of paranoia. It is a disturbance primarily of those functions which put the mind into relation with reality. Other functions remain apparently intact, and thereby show their inferiority. The relaxation of the psychological tension brings about a mental unrest, feelings of incompleteness, etc. Under its influence and by virtue of the suppression of the higher phenomena, the lower phenomena become greatly exaggerated; hence motor agitations, distressing emotions, mental ruminations. Finally, ideas are formed which resume, as it were, and interpret these phenomena and present the same general characters as the states from whence they arise; they are permanent and obsessive because they resume and express a permanent condition, they do not give rise to really insane convictions, but preserve the form of distressful emotions and ruminations, because they share in the incompleteness of function as regards reality and conviction which characterizes the disease (pp. 735 ff.).

Such is the new theory of obsessions and allied phenomena which M. Janet develops in the present work with characteristic acuteness and suppleness of thought on the basis of an extraordinarily wide experience of the facts. Final judgment on the theory must be left with the experts who possess something like the same intimate acquaintance with the facts. In particular, attention should be directed to the question whether, in all cases of obsession and impulsive ideas, there is what Janet calls a general lowering of the mental tension, or whether

there are some in which the decline is altogether of a special type. That is, are the 'specializations of the psychological insufficiencies' and 'systematizations of the derivations' themselves symptoms of a more general state, or is the psychasthenia in such cases special and limited and without general significance? Janet seems not to have made this point very clear. Then, there is the further question as to whether, granting that the defect mentioned is primary and fundamental, the other phenomena can all be explained as derivations, specializations, systematizations and self-invented explanations of it. Janet's argument on this head is exceedingly plausible, but are not his facts colored by his theory? Only the expert can decide. One, however, who can claim no such title may still be permitted to question the meaning and scope of the conceptions employed. The central conception is that of 'psychological tension.' Now tension is a term of well-defined meaning in physics, but not in psychology. Janet himself admits that he uses the term only in a conventional sense. What, then, does the term thus used stand for? It stands with him for a certain constitution of the 'function of the real' which makes that function difficult as compared with other functions; it stands for relative complexity of content with concentration or synthesis. Here, then, we get another term, 'function of the real,' and this term is by no means clear. Since, however, it is here evidently of psychological, and not of epistemological or metaphysical import, we may assume that it refers to the apprehension of and reaction towards that which is subjectively taken for real.

The analysis of this function will, therefore, include, as one of its essential parts, the analysis of belief. Does Janet's analysis satisfy the conditions? No doubt it is true, as he claims, that a certain relative richness belongs to the content of that which is taken as real, when compared with a similar content; this relative complexity of content is one of the features, as Stout has observed, which distinguishes an actual sensation from the corresponding image. And Janet has done well to call attention to the importance of this factor in the sensible awareness of present time. But is it, in certain cases, *e. g.*, in the case of dreams, a more important factor than that of vividness or, again, than that of the absence of felt contradiction in the content? And is it, in general, a more essential factor than the motor elements which presumably enter into the consciousness of the attitude, the readiness to act, which seems to characterize all states of belief? It may well be doubted. Janet discredits the alleged motor factor in the consciousness of reality because he finds subjects

afflicted with all manner of scruples who appear to be entirely without any muscular defect. But need this prove more than that certain motor reactions may be absent without impairment of the muscular system in general? Finally, there is the conception of difficulty. The function of the real is difficult, it is a phenomenon of 'high tension,' involving concentration and a certain complexity of content. With this as a criterion, it ought to have been shown that the subordinate classes in the hierarchy of functions form a graduated series of decreasing complexity of content and diminishing concentration. Janet makes no pretence of showing this. But waiving this, we may raise the question of fact. Is it, in fact, always more difficult to perform the mental acts here classed as higher than it is to perform those which are ranked lower in the scale? Is it always harder to take something for real, *e. g.*, to perceive with conviction a present fact, than disinterestedly to entertain ideas?

One cannot but be struck by the low place assigned to abstract reasoning; it is placed in the third class, along with revery, not only below the apprehension of reality that leads to prompt and effective action, but below perception without conviction and with the sense of present time vague. There may be some reason for this in the case of subjects mentally unbalanced, whose endless ruminations are only too facile, though even in their case it does not certainly appear that these ruminations are more facile than the habits of their ordinary life. But it seems hardly applicable to the average run of men. The truth is that difficulty is a term entirely relative in its application; some functions are difficult to some which are easy to others. Plato's philosopher finds it difficult to adjust his actions to the conditions of an ill-adapted state, while the behavior of the shrewd and unscrupulous politician is prompt and effective. There is one thing, and perhaps one thing only, which is difficult, in different degrees, to all alike, and that is the prompt and effective manipulation of new contents of consciousness. But by the 'function of the real' Janet understands both more and less than this.

Attention has been called above to only the principal theses in this important work. There are besides a multitude of fine observations which will interest the general psychologist as well as the special student, the alienist and the practitioner. The usefulness of the book in this regard is greatly enhanced by an analytical index.

H. N. GARDINER.

SMITH COLLEGE.

*Philosophy of Conduct.* GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons. Pp. xxii + 663. \$3.50, *net*.

With regard to a work by a writer so well known as Professor Ladd many things will be taken for granted by readers of the *PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW*. They need not be told that his scholarship in his particular topic and in pertinent and allied branches of science is accurate and broad; that his treatment is detailed and exhaustive, as is witnessed, moreover, by nearly seven hundred closely-printed pages — an extent unapproached, I think, by any other single work on ethics in English; that in method his book is analytic of experience rather than purely *a priori*; that in outcome it is theistic; that in style it is clear and well illustrated by a scholarly array of facts. More briefly, readers will know that the work is weighty, judicious, one of the noteworthy discussions of morality, indispensable to students of the subject, and at the same time helpful to the plain man interested in such questions.

The task of the reviewer accordingly reduces itself to presenting an outline of the author's main scheme of treatment and of his more important discussions; and to indicating some of the views of the text that seem less complete, conclusive or clear, capable, it may be, of improvement in a second edition.

After four introductory chapters Professor Ladd's text falls into three main parts, dealing respectively with the agent of morality, the laws of morality and the ultimate worth of morality. The first consists of a discussion, chiefly psychological, but partly anthropological also, of the equipment of the human self, *quid* moral — no animal has the moral equipment, according to the author. The second discusses the virtuous life, giving an account of the cardinal virtues, of duty, of moral law, of moral principles, and of the distinctions and interrelations of these modes of moral behavior among themselves. The third discusses the cosmic nature of morality, its source, sanctions and ultimate significance; considering especially whether its essential worth consists in its happiness value, its social value, or its sanction by the rational will and judgment of the Absolute.

The account, in Part I., of the moral self is one of the best in ethical literature. Admitting that the intimate and important interrelations, genetic and static, of the moral and the social selves receive a scantier consideration than many investigators would think their due, it remains true that there are few accounts in English of the moral self psychologically as accurate and as exhaustive as Professor Ladd here offers. The equipment of the moral self is discussed, for convenience,

under the headings of feeling, judgment, and will. The chief moral feelings are obligation—which is fundamental,—approbation and merit, felicitously defined, after Professor Bowne, as ‘the desert of moral approval and the right to be rewarded accordingly.’ Ethical judgment is shown to involve time-consciousness, self-consciousness, causal consciousness and the category of ‘right’ as its universal predicate; to spring from domestic, tribal and religious customs; to be subject to an evolution, whose stages are pointed out, etc. The volitional equipment of the moral self is held to consist in moral freedom, which is discussed most thoroughly in some fifty pages or more, in a way that is not only valuable, but even interesting.

Coming to Part II., the cardinal virtues, defined as the habits of action which men, with practical unanimity, approbate because they are right, are happily classified into virtues of will, *e. g.*, courage, temperance, constancy; virtues of judgment, *e. g.*, wisdom, resignation, justness, trueness; and virtues of feeling, *e. g.*, friendship, hospitality, pity; and Dr. Ladd is careful to insist that the virtues form a unity within the personality of the moral self. To the present writer the accounts of courage, wisdom and trueness seem the most, those of temperance and justness the least successful. In the author’s discussion of virtue three points would probably be received with some doubt. First, are not virtues essentially qualities of character, rather than also (pp. 211, 371) habits of conduct? We no doubt frequently speak of brave actions, as well as of brave men, but isn’t the former a transferred usage? This point is of less importance, and is mentioned chiefly as an introduction to the next. For secondly, are not virtues in part matters of endowment, and not wholly matters of achievement? Indeed, are not genuine virtues, in the last analysis at least, *perfections* of character? Would a man be considered virtuous who did the best he could in view of his capacities, even if that best were tolerably bad? Would he not have to rise to what the circumstances demanded and achieve a standard excellence of conduct? In short, do not the virtues, considered as a whole, give at least a popular doctrine of objective and authoritative morality, as distinguished from the merely subjective morality of the individual conscience? And finally, is not the author’s doctrine that the different cardinal virtues, *e. g.*, courage and wisdom, or justice and mercy, may conflict, that their conflicts are in fact sufficiently inevitable to form practical antinomies, dependent on his doctrine that the virtues are habits of conduct rather than perfections of character? For if they are perfections of character they are wrongly defined if so defined as to

conflict. A man whose courage is of a kind that leads him to incur danger that he should avoid, could hardly be called brave in the *full moral* sense of the word, and similar would be the cases of those whose benevolence leads them to injustice, or whose justice involves them in cruelty. Such men would no doubt in a loose way be called brave, benevolent, and just, but their qualities could not well be called virtues in the sense of perfections of character. Some single supreme principle is no doubt needed to reconcile apparent conflicts, and to make possible the definition of the several cardinal virtues as perfections of character, and probably it is because of the absence of such a principle that Professor Ladd finds himself at a loss to reconcile them.

A further word is here called for regarding 'ethical antinomies,' as it is largely on them as a basis that Part III. rests. Professor Ladd does not rank these with metaphysical antinomies, as he does not consider that any of the contradictory propositions are scientifically established laws. But unless they are solved 'the good man \* \* \* is left hopelessly in the dark as to the real significance and worth of the right, and hopelessly at odds with himself, with his fellows, with his environment, and with the world of reality.' The first antinomy is 'the conflict between the sentient self and the moral self.' Pleasure has value for man; virtue has value for him; and the two interests are in conflict, or at any rate are far from being identical throughout. Second, 'there are almost unceasing conflicts among the virtues themselves.' Then 'there can be no doubt that constant conflicts arise between dutiful regard for one's own interest and a dutiful regard for the interests of others.' And finally, 'there is the eternal contrast, which so often issues in conflict, between the actual realization and the real ideal'; indeed, the men who seem to need it least feel most keenly the 'torment of the ideal.'

These 'antinomies' the author looks upon as left upon his hands by empirical ethics, after that inquiry has done its utmost, and in Part III. he seeks for such aid as the speculative methods of philosophy, especially of the philosophy of religion, can give. Relying on his earlier works to prove that the world-ground is a rational and personal will, he seeks to show that psychology, anthropology and the other empirical sciences fail satisfactorily to explain morality and its antinomies, but that the desired explanations are forthcoming as soon as the Absolute is accepted as at once the source, the sanction and the goal of morality; at least the stress of the antinomies is then eased, for rational ground appears for a willingness to forego loss of pleasure and of personal interest, and to undergo the torments of the ideal.

The author's empirical critics will naturally look upon these conclusions as overdrawn. Many of them will look upon the antinomies as unduly sharpened, and upon the difference between the empirical and the speculative solutions as exaggerated. A social source sanction and goal of morality they would admit to be much less august than a divine, but they would think it quite as truly conscious, and accordingly the same in kind, in the principle of its authority, and in the nature of its efficacy as a solvent of antinomies. Some no doubt will even go so far as to regard society in this rôle as closer and surer, less shadowy and precarious than Professor Ladd's absolute.

But many readers will probably be most interested in some statement that will give them in brief compass some idea of Professor Ladd's general conception of morality. And while any such statement is sure to do the author but scant justice, it may be that the following paragraph, taken from his text, p. 528, will serve the purpose reasonably well, when read in connection with what has already been said.

"For every individual his own ideal of moral selfhood furnishes the criteria, the sanctions, and the end of morality in such manner that if he conforms his conduct to this ideal he is entitled, at the bar of universal moral reason, to be called a good man. By such conformity the individual realizes in his own personal experience the nature of that which is eternally and unchangeably right. *For it is the spirit of devotion to the ideal of personal being in social relations that constitutes the very essence of ethical rightness* [italics Ladd's]. Only it must never be forgotten that this spirit itself involves and absorbs the entire self—involves all the functions and activities of moral personality in its service daily and momentarily, and absorbs them all in the rational pursuit of its more and more perfect realization."

S. E. MEZES.

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS.

*Experimental Psychology and its Bearing upon Culture.* GEO. MALCOLM STRATTON. New York, The Macmillan Company. 1903. Pp. vii + 331.

To all who have seriously at heart the welfare of experimental psychology such a book as this which Mr. Stratton has given us must be sincerely welcome. The laboratory psychology has been passing through a period of adolescence, during which it has, like other young sciences, experienced multifarious forms of misapprehension, and it is fair, perhaps, to say, that it has suffered quite as much from its ostensible friends as from its enemies. One of the most persistent

of misunderstandings is the conviction shared by many critics, that experimental psychology has little or no bearing upon any of the deeper problems of philosophy. Such an impression is in point of fact based solely upon the failure to distinguish between form and substance. Certainly the chronoscope and the induction coil do not immediately suggest metaphysical interests, but Mr. Stratton's timely book is devoted to showing that when used for purposes of psychological analysis even these material devices, and others of like ilk, may contribute to the solution of philosophical problems. Thus we meet with experimental evidence telling for one conclusion or another in the case of the mind-body problem, the problems of space and time, the problem of personal identity and sundry other philosophical questions. Mr. Stratton has not attempted primarily to popularize his subject. He writes with a firm and scholarly grasp of his material for the person of trained intelligence, who is in some degree at least familiar with the general trend of philosophical thought, especially those phases of it which find their expression in the interests and ideals of contemporary culture. The plan of the book involves, first, the attempt to make vivid and clear the exact procedure in typical psychological experiments; and second, the effort to show how the results so obtained are relevant to certain significant philosophical inquiries. Thanks to a graceful style, this program is carried out with a smoothness and finish which render one's reading unusually agreeable and satisfactory. The philosopher, the psychologist and the layman will all find the work interesting and suggestive. Profuse illustrations do much to enhance the definiteness of the impressions about experimentation.

A brief historical introduction is followed by an admirable statement of the nature and scope of experimental methods. The fatuity of the earlier strictures upon such experimentation, as being inevitably limited to a few problems touching the psycho-physiology of the sense organs, is effectively exposed by citations of results already attained. On the other hand, the absurdly sweeping claims of incidental enthusiasts find no comfort in our author's conservative estimates. Theoretically every psychological problem is susceptible to experimental attack and already wide ranges of the psychological field have been successfully explored by the experimentalist. But there are regions into which his ingenuity has not as yet penetrated and no one can say how long such entrance may be deferred.

In a chapter on mental measurement we have a lucid analysis of the tangled controversial maze which has grown up around this sub-

ject. In a matter where parties are so numerous it is hardly to be expected that the author should unequivocally carry the day for his own view, and he is likely to find among his professional colleagues more dissenters from this part of his text than from any other. The position maintained is that we can and do unquestionably measure mental operations in regard to their temporal, spatial and intensive characteristics. To establish this position Mr. Stratton first undertakes to discredit the compelling force of the *a priori* arguments denying the possibility of mental measurements, after which he falls back upon the practical fact that many such measurements *are* apparently made. In the case of intensive measurements he takes the bull fairly by the horns and maintains, contrary to the more usual view, that the scale by which such measurements are to be judged is in reality a psychical scale and not the scale of physical weights, lights, sounds, etc., constituting the stimuli. Fortunately the practical value of such measurements is not jeopardized by the theory which one entertains as to their ultimate nature. Whether in reaction time tests, for example, we really and primarily measure the time occupied by certain neural operations, or the time of a series of psychical events, is of relatively small importance, provided we can by such methods get at certain of the differences which mark off from one another the processes of sensation, perception, recognition, association, etc. Thus the reviewer holds a somewhat different position upon this matter from that set forth by Mr. Stratton, but this does not detract from his ability to profit by Mr. Stratton's investigations involving measurements. Meanwhile the obstinate fact remains, to which the author seems hardly to accord sufficient weight, that whatever processes we may *include* in our measurements, the *termini* of all our actual mensuration, whether spatial, temporal or intensive, are physical objects or events. If this fact be admitted, it is difficult to see how one can altogether avoid the conclusion of those who maintain the functional or vicarious theory of mental measurements.

In two chapters dealing with unconscious ideas Mr. Stratton launches a very sane and temperate attack upon the common form of this doctrine whereby we are supposed to possess a sort of psychical homunculus, which steps in now and then to accomplish various remarkable performances, telepathic, hypnotic, etc., for which our ordinary mind seems incompetent. The burden of his argument rests, first and positively, upon the exposure of the inadequacy of the evidence advanced in support of the theory, second and negatively, upon the doctrine of parsimony in scientific explanation. On the other hand,

Mr. Stratton defends a much emaciated form of the doctrine in his contention, based upon numerous experiences, experimental and otherwise, that mental differences exist of which we are not, and apparently cannot be, directly aware. He cites, as illustrating the point, certain experiments of his own in which the reactions to lighted surfaces were found to be different, depending upon the presence or absence of subliminal shadows. The genuineness of such distinctions no one can question, certainly no experimentalist, but they afford no comfort to the believer in the old-fashioned unconscious idea. They are rather unnoticed increments, or nuances, of sensations and ideas.

An interesting account of illusions and their value for psychology as revealing the fundamental features of the perception process, leads on to two rather elaborate chapters dealing with space. The discussion runs all the way from such topics as the spatial perceptions of blind persons to the Kantian doctrine of the transcendental æsthetic. In this connection Mr. Stratton makes use of his own interesting and well-known experiments in which he subjected himself for a time to the distress of prisms inverting the ordinary space relations of the optical field. From these and other experiments he reaches a positive reply to the question which Berkeley and other philosophers have so often propounded. Neither touch nor vision can claim any genuine primacy as avenues of spatial information. Their action is reciprocal and the real world of our psychological space is one constructed through our efforts to harmonize our often conflicting and disparate experiences. The existence of an auditory space Mr. Stratton regards as problematical but possible.

The next two chapters contain a capital account of the important features of memory with its problems of temporal sequence and a discussion of their bearing upon our feeling of personal identity. A chapter on imitation and suggestion affords opportunity for an exposition of the more significant social and psychological phases of these processes brought out by recent writing. Æsthetic phenomena and the affective life in general are given two chapters in which the author has attained a welcome freshness and simplicity in dealing with matters where one is accustomed to meet stale platitude and obscurity.

The connection of body and mind is discussed in a chapter somewhat too brief to be altogether fair to the various relevant facts and theories at present available. To mention but a single point, there seems to be hardly sufficient justice done to such views as those of Goltz and Loeb upon the localization of psychical functions.

A final chapter is largely devoted to a discussion of the problem of the soul as it bears upon the experimentalist's work. Mr. Stratton adopts the position now so commonly held, that psychology needs no *tertium quid* beyond its states of consciousness, and at the same time he makes it abundantly clear that such a doctrine carries with it no necessary prejudice to the reality and sanctity of human personality.

JAMES ROWLAND ANGELL.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

#### PHILOSOPHICAL.

*The Development of Modern Philosophy, with other Lectures and Essays.* ROBERT ADAMSON. Edited by N. R. SORLEY. 2 vols. Edinburgh and London. 1903. Pp. xlviii + 358 and xv + 330. 18 s. net.

These handsome volumes are the posthumous legacy of the late Professor Adamson. The first volume contains a sketch of modern philosophy from Descartes to Hegel, and also the sketch of a theory of knowledge. Volume two covers seven occasional papers, and besides the *Principles of Psychology* covering pp. 161-330. The first volume has an excellent portrait of the author, a memorial 'introduction' by Professor Sorley, and a bibliography (arranged by years).<sup>1</sup>

The remarkable thing about these volumes is their maturity of expression and argument, seeing that they are made up of students' lecture notes and had no revision by the lecturer. The pages read with all the deliberate weighing of reasons and choosing of words of a labored composition.

In his views Adamson is one of the sanest and surest of those who reverted to a judicious naturalism largely under the weight of the evolution doctrine. His careful sense of fact and reverence for reality show in all the constructive parts. In the psychology we find a frank acceptance of the genetic point of view and a successful criticism of the logical and faculty doctrine; but yet we miss the definiteness of well-thought-out theory. He usually stops by saying in effect that any formula here or there must take account of development; but having said so much he does not work out sufficiently well-developed genetic principles to solve the problems which the development hypothesis raises. No doubt we miss here just what he would himself have aimed to give had he prepared the manuscripts for publication. Speaking of

<sup>1</sup> The present writer takes interest in the fact that Adamson's last work was the series of articles on logical topics contributed to Vol. I. of the *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (83 titles).

the psychology only we may say that it is a fair and fine statement of the transition — and its grounds — to the current genetic point of view. Of especial interest and value are the chapters on thought — a topic on which reconstructive theories are in the air — although I find the value mainly critical and the interest mainly personal.

*David Hume and His Influence on Philosophy and Theology.*

JAMES ORR. *The World's Epoch-Makers.* New York, Scribners (imported). 1903. Pp. viii + 246. \$1.25.

*Rousseau und Naturalism in Life and Thought.* W. H. HUDSON.

Same, 1903. Pp. x + 260.

These are interesting additions to the series of 'Epoch-Makers'; they are liberal in the matter of biography, and the interpretations are broad and general in the interests of less philosophical readers. The volume on Hume goes into the theological bearings of that philosopher's work.

*Naturalism and Agnosticism.* JAMES WARD. 2d ed. 2 vols.

London, Black. 1903. Pp. xx + 333, and xiii + 301.

In this edition — more than a year over-due — Professor Ward revises by adding notes addressed mainly to his critics. He again dwells upon details at issue with Mr. Spencer. Apart from the points themselves — and often they are too minute to count much in matters now mainly historical — the personal controversy is too spirited. It seems to the present writer that Professor Ward's original lectures were somewhat weakened by his animus in attacking in hundreds of pages a philosophy which to judge from his epithets was beneath attack! Spencer's work was epoch-making; he is a figure to reverence, no matter whether we agree with the Synthetic Philosophy or not. It is a phenomenon — this way Englishmen turn and rend their greatest living philosopher, seeming to forget that they are breathing a different intellectual atmosphere by virtue of his work! Spencer stands with Darwin — at least out of England! — a glory to the British intellect.<sup>1</sup>

In his notes now added Professor Ward touches upon many matters, always with a sure hand and large intelligence; he takes especial

<sup>1</sup> All this apart from my essential agreement with my friend Professor Ward in most of his larger criticisms of cosmic evolution. It is just now reported that Mr. Spencer has been awarded a Nobel prize; outside of England at least such an award would generally be considered appropriate and old England congratulated that she has so fitting a candidate in the moral sciences!

It is indeed with 'reverence' that these lines are revised, being left to stand just as originally written, while Spencer lies dead at Brighton.

pains to cite the best opinion in matters of physical science, even when it is necessary to modify the views expressed in his text. He is to be congratulated upon the wide circulation of the book, as well as upon the fact that he has by common consent made a permanent and very valuable contribution to philosophy. Many besides the writer hope that he will develop in a separate work the outline of the constructive views presented in the Volume II. before us—an outline most suggestive, but yet so sketchy that it is in some respects baffling and obscure.<sup>1</sup>

J. M. B.

### NOTES AND NEWS.

THE statement made in our last issue, on the authority of the daily press, to the effect that Dr. Scripture has resigned his position at Yale University, is erroneous. Dr. Scripture has been given leave of absence for a year to prosecute his researches on phonetics under a grant from the Carnegie Institution.

WE note in the published account of the past year's work of the Carnegie Institution that but two grants were made to psychologists (apart from certain Research Assistantships). This is certainly not a large 'plum,' and it does not go far toward the realization of the expectations excited by the report of the committee on psychology printed in the First Year-book. We sincerely hope that the present year will see the maturing of plans to develop larger undertakings in this and other subjects.

THE journal *Kantstudien* has issued a circular announcing the preparation of a *Festheft* on February 14, 1904, in commemoration of

<sup>1</sup> One of the longest notes in Volume I. deals with the view of evolution worked out recently by several writers, and called by the present reviewer 'Organic Selection' and 'Orthoplasy.' Professor Ward follows out his earlier suggestion that this view runs parallel with his own theory of 'Subjective Selection.' In this note he agrees with the writer (see the recent book, *Development and Evolution*, pp. 48, 108) that the main point as regards the direction or determination of evolution by the individual's accommodations was not enforced by him: but he holds that the process involved, so far as *conscious* selection is concerned, is what he called subjective selection—a statement in which I fully concur. I confess I do not see the force of the criticism of the name 'Organic Selection'; it overlooks the use of 'organic' as adjective to 'organism,' a usage as old and good as that which makes it adjective to 'organ,' *e. g.*, the expressions 'organic world,' 'organic remains,' etc. (see *Century* and *Standard Dictionaries*).

the one hundredth anniversary of the death of Immanuel Kant. The editor, Professor Vaihinger, of Halle, also proposes to organize a 'Kant Society' for the support of the *Kantstudien*, which has been heretofore published at a financial loss. (Annual fee, M. 20, which may be sent in America to Professor J. E. Creighton, Ithaca, New York, the representative of the journal in the United States.)

THERE is also to be a celebration of this anniversary at Königsberg. A tablet is to be unveiled at or near the house in which the philosopher lived.

As all the world now knows, Herbert Spencer died at Brighton on December 8. His remains have since been cremated. The public press has been full of accounts of his life and estimates of his work. Notable among these in America are those of the *New York Evening Post* of December 8 and the *New York Daily Tribune*, the former from the pen of William James. The English papers give full accounts of Mr. Spencer and seem to realize, from the extraordinary appreciations of the press of all countries, that the first contemporary British thinker is no longer living. It is reported that Mr. Spencer's *Autobiography* is ready for press. The present writer has all along been impressed with the lesser honor done Spencer in his own country; and the following incident may serve to illustrate it. Having occasion, while in London in 1903, to gather photographic reproductions of great Englishmen, he inquired for certain of them at the establishment at which this is a specialty — reproductions of paintings in all the great world galleries. It was found that portraits of all other prominent Englishmen in London had been photographed and copies were on sale; but that no photograph of the painting of Spencer, paid for some years ago by popular subscription and then hanging in the Tait Gallery, had ever been taken, because—as said the proprietor — 'it has never been asked for.'

J. M. B.

FULL announcements of the *British Journal of Psychology* (noted in our last issue) are now at hand, containing the 'editorial' of Professor Ward and Dr. Rivers, the responsible editors. The numbers are to appear at irregular intervals, to contain articles only, and to constitute volumes of 450 pp., royal 8vo. The first issue will appear this present month. (London, Clay & Sons; subscription, 15 s.)

The *Journal of Comparative Neurology* is to be somewhat enlarged in its scope, as its new name, *Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology*, indicates. The editorial board remains the

same — President Herrick, and Professors Herrick and O. S. Strong — except that a comparative psychologist, Dr. R. M. Yerkes, of Harvard, is added. A long list of collaborators is announced. We wish the *Journal*, in its new form, a successful and influential career. (C. Judson Herrick, Granville, Ohio; subscription, bimonthly, \$4.)

The following volumes, additional to those already announced in these pages, have been arranged in 'The Library of Historical Psychology' edited by Professor Baldwin: *Feeling and Emotion*, by Professor H. N. Gardiner, of Smith College, and *Association and Associationism* by Professor H. C. Warren, of Princeton University.

THE following news notes are gathered from the press.

PROFESSOR KUNO FISCHER has retired from active service in the University of Heidelberg.

PROFESSOR HUGO MÜNSTERBERG, of Harvard has been appointed 'non-resident lecturer' in Psychology at Columbia University for the current half-year.

DR. W. McDOUGALL, well-known from his experimental publications, has been appointed Wilde lecturer in psychology in Oxford University in succession to Professor Stout.

THE formation of a German society for experimental psychology is announced in the *Zeit. f. psych.* (33. IV.), to hold its first meeting at Giessen.

---

### NEW BOOKS RECEIVED UP TO JANUARY 7.

*Zur Ethik des Gesamtwillens, eine social-philosophische Untersuchung.* R. GOLDSCHIED. Bd. I. Leipzig, Reissland, 1902. Pp. vi + 552. Mk. 10.

*The Nature of Man.* E. METCHNIKOFF. Tr. by P. C. MITCHELL. New York and London, Putnams, 1903. Pp. xvi + 309.

*The Philosophy of Hobbes in Extracts and Notes Collated from his Writings.* Selected and arranged by J. E. WOODBRIDGE. Minneapolis, Wilson Co., 1903. Pp. vi + 392. [A very much needed, and very badly printed book.]

*Esquisse d'un Système de Psychologie rationnelle.* É. LUBAC. Pref. by H. BERGSON. Paris, Alcan, 1904. Pp. xvi + 248. Fr. 3.50.

- Response in the Living and the Non-Living.* J. C. BOSE. New York and London, Longmans, 1902. Pp. xix + 198. [A series of papers reprinted from scientific journals, 1900-1902.]
- Experiments in 1893-1896 upon the Colour Relation between Lepidopterous Larvæ and their Surroundings, etc.* E. B. POULTON. Trans. Ent. Soc. of London, Oct. 5, 1903. Pp. 311-374. [Contains very fine three-color plates.]
- Method in Philosophy.* Address before Aristotelian Soc., London, Nov. 2, 1903. S. H. HODGSON. London, Harrison & Son, 1903. Pp. 15.
- Das Seelenleben des Kindes.* K. GROOS. Berlin, Reuther u. Reichard, 1903. Pp. 229.
- Animal Education: an Experimental Study in the Psychical Development of the White Rat correlated with the Growth of its Nervous System.* J. B. WATSON. Chicago Univ. Press, 1903. Pp. 122.
- Evolution and Adaptation.* T. H. MORGAN. New York and London, Macmillans, 1903. Pp. x + 470. [A general work by the author of *Regeneration*, written in an anti-Darwinian sense, and making much of the sort of phenomena described in the earlier work.]
- Freedom and Responsibility.* A. T. HADLEY. New York, Scribners, 1903. Pp. 175.
- Philosophy in Poetry: A Study of Sir John Davies' Poem 'Nosce Teipsam.'* E. H. SNEATH. New York, Scribners, 1903. Pp. 319. [The poem itself occupies pp. 221-319.]
- Le Langage intérieur et les Paraphasies.* G. SAINT-PAUL. Paris, Alcan, 1904. Pp. 313. Fr. 5. [A comprehensive and well-informed treatise on 'la fonction endophasique'—endophasia.]
- Man's Place in the Universe.* A. R. WALLACE. New York, McClure, Phillips & Co., 1903. Pp. viii + 320.
- Die Gesichtspunkte und die Tatsachen der psychophysischen Methodik.* G. E. MÜLLER. Wiesbaden, Bergmann, 1904. Pp. viii + 244.
- Laura Bridgman.* MAUD HOWE and FLORENCE H. HALL. Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1904. Pp. xii + 394.
- An Introduction to the History of Modern Philosophy.* A. S. DEWING. Philadelphia and London, Lippincott, 1903. Pp. 346.
- Le Bonheur et l'Intelligence.* OSSIP-LOURIÉ. Paris, Alcan, 1904. P 3 2r. 50..p2.01

*Die soziale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie.* L. STEIN. 2. Auf. Stuttgart, Enke, 1903. Pp. xvi + 598.

*St. Anselm's Proslogium; Monologium; An Appendix on Behalf of the Fool by Gaunilon; and Cur Deus Homo.* Trans. by S. N. DEANE. Chicago, Open Court Co., 1903. Pp. xxxv + 288. \$1.00 and paper 50c. [A needed translation of selected works of Anselm with a bibliography of works on Anselm and selections from prominent expositors of his doctrines. In the series of Philosophical Classics.]

*The Canon of Reason and Virtue* (Lao-Tze). Trans. from the Chinese by P. CARUS. Chicago, Open Court Co., 1903. Pp. 96-138. 25 cents.

*The Psychology of Child Development.* IRVING KING. Introd. by John Dewey. Chicago, University Press, 1903. Pp. xxi + 265. \$1.25.

*Die Lehre vom Denken.* Theil II. A. BASTIAN. Berlin, Dümmler, 1903. Pp. x + 192. [Written by this distinguished anthropologist from the race-history point of view.]

*Recherches cliniques et thérapeutiques sur l'épilepsie, l'hystérie et l'idiotie.* BOURNEVILLE AND OTHERS. (Compte-Rendu du service des enfants idiots, épileptiques et arriérés de Bicêtre pendant l'année 1902. Vol. XXIII.) Paris, Progrès Médical (F. Alcan), 1903. Pp. cxx + 304.

*L'éducation fondée sur la science.* C. A. LAISANT. Préf. d'ALFRED NAQUET. Paris, Alcan, 1904. Pp. 153.

## EDITORS' ANNOUNCEMENT.

It is intended that departmental reviewing shall be a prominent feature of the BULLETIN. 'Effective editors' will conduct the various departments. New books will have brief characterization pending the preparation of reviews. Concise abstracts of magazine articles are to be printed, and the 'contents' of the journals given in full. Researches in progress are to be reported. An editor will be charged to report, in occasional articles, the 'progress' of psychology as a whole. Items in any department, notices, and announcements may be sent to either of the responsible editors.

